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In a two-country model, I investigate the role of a pre-negotiation phase
as an information-sharing and certification device to restore the feasibility of
an efficient environmental agreement when countries’ abatement costs are pri-
vate information and participation is voluntary. When uncertainty regarding
abatement costs is high, the welfare gains of reducing information asymme-
tries and reaching the first-best agreement will be sufficiently large to design
budget-balanced transfers that compensate both countries for the loss of the
information rent they could obtain by staying privately informed. Both coun-
tries then accept to share and certify their abatement costs during the pre-
negotiation phase.
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The classical explanation for the failure of international negotiations on en-
vironmental issues is the free-rider problem: countries have the possibility to opt
out of the negotiations while still enjoying the benefits of the global agreement. If
they have some private information, countries may also have an incentive to exag-
gerate their privately known costs of implementing the agreement (or understate
their privately known benefits) in order to reduce the effort they have to supply
and leave most of the burden on other countries. It is well-known from the mech-
anism design literature that inefficiencies arising from the free-rider problem are
particularly relevant in contexts plagued by information asymmetry.1 At the same
time, international environmental agreements are very often preceded by discussion
rounds, during which countries do not negotiate quantitative targets but exchange
information regarding the costs and benefits of an agreement. This paper takes a
mechanism design approach and studies the effect of asymmetric information about
pollution abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement
when participation in this agreement is voluntary. It also investigates the role of a
pre-negotiation phase as an information-sharing device to alleviate the inefficiencies
generated by information asymmetry and voluntary participation.
Environmental agreements differ in scope and substance but most of them
tend to be formulated through a process following a similar pattern (Wagner 2001).
Countries first agree on an initial convention, i.e. an umbrella convention, that
generally does not contain any emission reduction target or any monetary transfer
scheme between countries. Rather, this convention sets up institutions entitled to
negotiate all the subsequent environmental agreements with binding commitments.
In 1979, following increasing concerns by policy-makers about the harmful effects
of acid rains, 33 countries signed the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air-Pollution (LRTAP). This initial Convention served as a basis for eight follow-
1For example, Rob (1989) and Mailath & Postlewaite (1990) stress the role of participation
constraints to generate inefficiency.
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up protocols and a series of amendments, but it did not mention any numerical
goal or abatement measure. Other examples include the United Nation Framework
Convention on Climate Change (1992) or the Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer (1985), which acted as frameworks for subsequent agreements
containing quantitative targets, i.e. the Kyoto and Montreal protocols respectively.
A key component of this pre-negotiation phase is the creation of a scientific
body to investigate particular issues. It may also involve the assessment of exist-
ing legal regimes. For example, the LRTAP Convention put in place a structure
to gather information on national emissions as well as national pollution and en-
ergy policies. An emission monitoring system was also set up under the auspices
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) to verify infor-
mation transmitted by the countries.2 The contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, I show how the presence of information asymmetry about pollution abate-
ment costs may exacerbate the free-rider problem and result in the implementation
of inefficient agreements. The second and main contribution is the introduction of a
pre-negotiation stage during which countries have the opportunity to exchange ver-
ifiable information through an international agency (assisted by a scientific body)
and reduce the information asymmetry at the negotiation stage. The objective is
to examine in which contexts countries have an incentive to use this pre-negotiation
phase as an information-sharing device and whether this restores the feasibility of
an efficient agreement.
My analysis is carried out within the framework of the private provision of a
2This is also true for the two other examples mentioned above. By signing the UNFCCC, indus-
trialized countries committed themselves to provide the Conference of the Parties with clear data
about their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and about regional programs containing measures
to mitigate climate change and with information related to implementation (which could give an
indication of the political willingness to implement emission reductions). A subsidiary body of the
UNFCCC was in charge of assessing this information. This reporting obligation, however, did not
cover the developing countries. The Vienna Convention established the United Nations Environ-
ment Program (UNEP) as a secretariat and asked this body to convene a workshop to develop a
more common understanding of factors affecting the ozone layer, including the costs and effects of
possible control measures (Benedick 1998, p. 45).
3
public good under asymmetric information. The public good considered here is the
reduction of some transboundary pollutant. Countries incur emission abatement
costs and can only capture a share of the environmental benefits generated by their
abatement efforts. Environmental negotiations are modeled as a two-stage process.
In a first stage, countries sign an umbrella convention and set up an international
agency. They agree on the role and the prerogatives of this agency, but as it is the
case for most existing umbrella conventions, they don’t agree on any emission targets
or monetary transfers. In a second stage, countries negotiate an environmental
agreement consisting of binding commitments to some emission abatement levels
and monetary transfers. In the first stage, they only have common prior beliefs
about their emission abatement costs and they have to decide on the information
structure of the negotiation stage. Specifically, they have two options. First, they
can investigate these costs individually and report the results of these investigations
to the international agency, which will then design an agreement based on that
information. In that case, emission reductions will be negotiated under asymmetric
information. Second, as it was the case under the LRTAP convention, they could set
up a framework for sharing information (through an international agency assisted by
a scientific body, for example). To be useful in reducing asymmetric information, this
second option requires that countries can rely on the results of the joint investigations
about abatement costs and can base their negotiations about quantitative targets
in the next stage on these results. In other words, the international agency should
serve as a certification device, i.e. it should have the ability to monitor and verify
the information transmitted by countries.3
I first consider a model without pre-negotiation stage, in which each country
knows its own abatement cost, but not that of the other country. An agreement is
feasible if all countries are willing to participate and if they all reveal their abatement
3The role of certification device played by the international agency is important. In a model
without certification, a country could possibly manipulate strategically the information that is
being shared.
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cost truthfully. Due to a trade-off between ensuring participation in the agreement
and truth-telling, a first-best agreement, i.e. an agreement that maximizes global
welfare, is not feasible when the range of the distribution of abatement cost types
is too large. A large support means that abatement costs are more uncertain and
also that potential abatement costs are more heterogenous. With homogeneous
abatement costs (more concentrated support), incentives to misreport its own type
are less important, so it becomes easier to solve the tension between truth-telling
and participation to implement the first-best agreement.
Second, I introduce a (pre-negotiation) certification stage, during which coun-
tries can decide to share information through an international agency, which will
then certify countries’ types. The effects of certification at the negotiation stage are
twofold. On the one hand, the information asymmetry between countries is reduced.
Intuitively, this effect will be stronger when the level of uncertainty about abate-
ment costs is high because the proportion of types exerting their non-cooperative
abatement effort in the second-best agreement increases. For this reason, the total
welfare under the second-best agreement will be close to its non-cooperative level,
which results in substantial welfare gains of reducing information asymmetries and
reaching the first-best agreement. On the other hand, the country certifying its
abatement cost type loses the possibility to misreport its type, and thereby may see
its monetary transfer in the first-best agreement reduced. This effect will be weaker
for higher levels of uncertainty because the share of types receiving an information
rent in the second-best agreement (i.e. types that do not exert the non-cooperative
abatement effort) is smaller.
Consequently, certification will restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement
only if the level of uncertainty is high because the first effect dominates and both
countries agree to gather information through the international agency. For those
high levels of uncertainty, the welfare gains of reducing information asymmetries and
reaching the first-best agreement will be sufficiently large to design first-best budget-
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balanced transfers that compensate both countries for the loss of their expected
information rent. For lower levels of uncertainty, a larger proportion of types is
entitled to an information rent in the second-best mechanism and it is impossible
to design first-best budget-balanced transfers for which both countries at the same
time opt for certification. There is always at least one country free-riding on the
other country’s certification.
Some articles have developed specific applications of the mechanism design
theory to environmental economics (e.g. Rob 1989; Baliga & Maskin 2003; Ca-
parros et al. 2004; Helm & Wirl 2014; Konrad & Thum 2014 or Helm & Wirl
2016a). The model the closest to the one developed in this study is that of Marti-
mort & Sand-Zantman (2016). They also highlight a trade-off between solving free
riding due to asymmetric information and voluntary participation. They derive the
conditions under which the first-best abatement levels are not implementable and
analyze the characteristics of a second-best mechanism. Similar inefficiencies were
pointed out in related setups under some conditions regarding the payoff functions
and the distributions of types.4 By contrast, I propose a channel to restore the fea-
sibility of the first-best agreement, i.e. the introduction of a pre-negotiation stage
with information exchange and certification.
In the contexts of transboundary pollution and incomplete information, some
articles have analyzed how unilateral actions can be used as a signaling device to
transmit countries’ private information and either influence abatement decisions of
other self-interested countries (Brandt 2004; Elofsson 2007), or affect the outcome
of future environmental negotiations (Espinola-Arredondo & Munoz-Garcia 2012;
4In the context of public good economies, Laffont & Maskin (1979) show that no truthful and
efficient mechanisms may exist if individual rationality constraints are taken into account and if,
without transfers, some types are worse off under the efficient mechanism than under the outside
option. This occurs when the heterogeneity in terms of payoffs is too large. In the private goods
case, Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983) show the impossibility of attaining ex-post efficiency with
an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism if the seller’s and buyer’s valuations
are distributed over intervals that have a nonempty intersection. If these intervals intersect, it is
more uncertain whether the valuation of the seller is higher than the valuation of the buyer.
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Brandt & Nannerup 2013). In this paper, I focus on the role of information shar-
ing and certification (at an ex-ante stage, abstracting from signaling incentives) in
the formation of efficient environmental agreements. Kakeu & Johnson (2018) also
study the incentives for information-sharing at an ex-ante stage. However, they
concentrate on a different problem in which the unknown damage cost is the same
for both countries but each of them receives a private signal about this unknown
parameter and uses it to form non-cooperatively its environmental policy.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the main
assumptions of the two-country model. Section 2 shows the effect of asymmetric
information on the feasibility of the first-best agreement without certification. The
results of this section (i.e. the existence of a trade-off between solving free riding due
to asymmetric information and voluntary participation) are along the lines of the
existing literature, e.g. Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2016). Section 3 is the main
contribution: the introduction of a pre-negotiation stage with certification. Section
4 discusses some assumptions of the model. I conclude in section 5.
1 Setting of the model
There are two countries or two groups of countries (i = 1, 2) that exert some non-
negative pollution abatement efforts ai. Country i’s payoff derived from abatement






Global abatement benefit is simply the total quantity of abatement, i.e. (a1 +
a2). This global benefit is shared equally between countries: each country i receives
a share of this global benefit equal to (a1 + a2)/2. Countries are heterogeneous in
terms of their marginal cost of abatement. By exerting abatement effort ai, country
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i incurs a cost of 1
2θi
a2i . For tractability, I adopt a quadratic form where θi can
be interpreted as the characteristic of the technology of country i. A higher θi
corresponds to a lower cost of abatement effort. In the rest of the paper, we will use
the term low-cost countries to refer to countries with a high θi.
Environmental agreements between countries consist of abatement levels aki
and transfers tki for each country: y






2). Country i may receive a
transfer tki for undertaking the requested abatement (where the superscript k is
used to differentiate between the types of agreements analyzed in the model, e.g.
first-best, second-best, etc.). Examples of international treaties allowing for the
possibility of monetary or technology transfers are the Montreal Protocol or the
Kyoto Protocol.5
As this will reveal useful for the analysis, I define two important benchmark
cases: the non-cooperative equilibrium and the first-best agreement. When countries
don’t negotiate an international agreement, they choose their abatement levels to
maximize their own payoff. As they act non-cooperatively, there is no transfer
between countries.
Definition 1 The non-cooperative abatement levels (aN1 , a
N
2 ) are the abatement lev-



















and tNi = 0, for i = 1, 2. The payoff of country i when both countries choose their





θj, for i 6= j.
Under the non-cooperative equilibrium, countries do not internalize the bene-
5Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol established a fund to facilitate technological cooperation
about non-ozone depleting substances and technology transfers to assist developing countries. Ar-
ticle 11 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for the possibility of monetary transfers from developed to
developing countries.
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fits of their abatement activity on the other country and there is an under-provision
of emission abatement. The second benchmark case is the first-best agreement in
which global welfare is maximized and countries internalize the impact of their own
abatement choice on the other country:
Definition 2 The first-best abatement levels (aFB1 , a
FB
2 ) are the abatement levels
that maximize the global welfare:
(aFB1 , a
FB













2 ) is the first-best agreement where a
FB
i = θi and
tFBi ∈ R are such that tFB1 + tFB2 = 0, for i = 1, 2. The payoff of country i when




i , for i 6= j.
In both benchmark cases, low-cost countries are those that abate the most.
It is also interesting to note that the increase in abatement efforts required by the
first-best agreement compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, aFBi − aNi = 12θi,
is more pronounced for low-cost countries (i.e. countries with a higher θi).
In our setting, benefits from abatement are linear, which substantially simpli-
fies the analysis and is an assumption widely used in the literature.6 This implies
that aNi and a
FB
i are dominant strategies (i.e. the abatement chosen is the same
whatever the behavior of the other country). This separability of efforts of course
neglects incentives to free-ride on the environmental benefits of cooperation. How-
ever, this problem is less severe here as we are looking at agreements in which both
countries participate.
6Finus et al. (2006) show that a linear specification can be justified for substantive reasons
since discounted climate damages that are linear in emissions are a good approximation of the
figures in the RICE model (Nordhaus & Yang 1996).
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2 Introducing asymmetric information
I introduce information asymmetry by assuming that the cost parameter θi is pri-
vately observed by each country i.7 As it is usually assumed in the mechanism
design literature, the countries’ types θi are independently drawn from the same
uniform distribution, defined on the support interval Rθ = [θM − γ, θM + γ].8,9
θM > 0 is the average abatement cost type. The length of the support is given by
2γ, with γ ∈ (0, θM). In the rest of the paper, we will interpret γ as a parame-
ter that measures the level of uncertainty about abatement costs (in the sense of
mean-preserving spread). The cumulative and probability distribution functions are








In this setting with information asymmetry, agreements between countries are mod-
eled using the concept of mechanism. By the revelation principle, there is no loss of
generality in restricting our attention to direct and truthful revelation mechanisms






2), is composed of
a level of abatement for each country aki : Rθ × Rθ → R that describes the abate-
ment effort of each country as a function of countries’ reported types, and a transfer
7Those costs should be understood in a broad sense as including not only technological costs
but also the opportunity and political costs of achieving a given emissions target. Therefore,
even though the abatement technologies might be the same across countries, the implementation
costs may differ. Also, as pointed by Espinola-Arredondo & Munoz-Garcia (2012), international
environmental agreements usually target overall emission levels, requiring the adoption of clean
technologies by several industries in a country’s economy, the precise dissemination of these tech-
nologies along all industries is difficult to observe by outsiders. This dissemination can, however,
be more accurately assessed by local governments.
8All the results in section 2 hold under more general distributions of types (see the proofs in
Appendices A1 and A2). The uniform distribution is made to obtain closed-form solutions in
section 3.
9A number of results in the mechanism design literature show that when agents’ types are corre-
lated, private information is irrelevant(full rent extraction, see McAfee & Reny 1992). However, in
the context of voluntary public good provision, Neeman (2004) has shown that full rent extraction
results do not hold if uncertainty about an agent’s type is in fact two dimensional. For example,
if uncertainty about a country’s type includes both uncertainty about the country’s abatement
cost and uncertainty about its beliefs and if countries’ beliefs do not uniquely determine their
abatement costs, then the extraction of the countries’ entire informational rents is impossible.
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tki : Rθ × Rθ → R that describes each country’s received transfer from undertaking
the requested abatement effort as a function of countries’ reported types.
I denote the utility of a country with type θi from the direct revelation mech-












+ tki (θ̂i, θ̂j)
To be implementable under asymmetric information and voluntary participa-
tion, a mechanism must satisfy three constraints. First, the mechanism must be
incentive compatible. Second, the mechanism must ensure that both countries want
to join the agreement (i.e. individual rationality). Finally, there is also a budget
balance constraint. These constraints are detailed below.
Bayesian incentive compatibility. Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mech-
anism yk(., .), requires that the expected utility of country i satisfies:
θi = argmaxθ̂i∈RθEθj [Vi(y
k(θ̂i, θj)|θi)] (1)
where Eθj [.] =
∫
Rθ
[.]f(θj)dθj denotes the expectation over the possible types of
country j. In other words, truth-telling gives country i the highest possible expected
utility, provided the other country j does. As, in the sequel, I focus on incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanisms, I will simplify the notation of the expected
utility of country i from the direct and truthful revelation mechanism yk(θi, θj) when
this country i is of type θi ∈ Rθ:
Uki (θi) ≡ Eθj [Vi(yk(θi, θj)|θi)]
A country of type θi will have an incentive to exaggerate its cost of effort (e.g. by
reporting a type θ̂i < θi) because it can abate at the same level as a higher-cost
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country θ̂i but at a lower marginal cost. Therefore, low-cost countries have more
incentives to misreport. To ensure truth-telling (condition (1)), the mechanism must
reward the countries with the lowest abatement costs by an extra amount that is
just equal to the gains from slightly overstating their abatement cost. In Lemma 1,
I show that this extra amount is given by expression (2).
Lemma 1 The direct revelation mechanism yk(., .) satisfies Bayesian incentive com-
patibility if and only if Eθj [a
k2







Where U̇ki (.) is the derivative of the expected utility function of country i (from the
direct and truthful revelation mechanism yk) with respect to θi.
Proof See Online Appendix A1. 
From Lemma 1, it immediately follows that an incentive compatible mecha-
nism must give a greater payoff to countries with lower abatement costs. Indeed,
integrating equation (2) yields:
Uki (θi) = U
k








where Uki (θM − γ) is the expected utility of country i when it has the highest
abatement cost (i.e. the country that has no incentive to misreport its type) and the
second term on the right-hand side is the additional payoff required by a country of
type θi to ensure truth-telling.








Definition 2). Using Lemma 1, we can then derive the first-best transfers that will
satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility:
Eθj [t
FB
i (θi, θj)] =
1
2




i (θM−γ, θj)] is the first-best expected transfer when country i has
a type θi = θM−γ and the term 12 [θi−(θM−γ)] can be interpreted as the information
rent necessary to ensure truthful revelation by all types θi > θM − γ. This term is
increasing in θi because low-cost countries contribute more to the total abatement




in expression (3) is equal to the difference between the social
and private marginal benefits of abatement and can be interpreted as a per-unit
Pigouvian subsidy granted to a country for undertaking the first-best abatement
effort.
Finally, we can see from equation (3), that the information rent is increasing in
the level of uncertainty, γ. When γ is small, the support Rθ is concentrated around
the mean, θM . Countries are relatively homogeneous and incentives problems are less
severe. All countries have similar abatement levels under the first-best agreement
and the incentives to misreport are lower. By contrast, when γ increases, there are
more opportunities for low-cost countries to misreport their types. Avoiding such
free-riding will require larger information rents.
Budget balance. I assume that no external source of funds is available and that





[tk1(θ1, θ2) + t
k
2(θ1, θ2)]f(θ1)f(θ2)dθ1dθ2 = E[t
k
1(θ1, θ2) + t
k
2(θ1, θ2)] = 0 (4)
where E[.] denotes the expectation over the set of possible types for countries 1 and
2. Intuitively, the mechanism must be self-financed. Any transfer to a country must
be covered by actual contributions. Note that there is no loss of generality in using
the ex-ante budget balance constraint instead of the more natural ex-post budget
balance constraint (tk1(θ1, θ2) + t
k
2(θ1, θ2) = 0) because, following Börgers & Norman
10I can relax this budget balance constraint, i.e. by assuming linkages with agreements in other
areas, but the main results would remain unchanged.
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(2009), if types are independent, for every ex-ante budget-balanced mechanism,
there exists an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism such that the allocation rule is
unchanged and the interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents.
Individual rationality. Finally, participation in an environmental agreement yk is
voluntary. The outside option is the non-cooperative equilibrium (see Definition 1).
Since countries know their type when deciding to join a treaty, the expected utility
of country i under this outside option is denoted by:







The interim individual rationality constraint then requires that:
Uki (θi) ≥ UNi (θi) for i = 1, 2 (6)
Implementation of the first-best agreement
Before turning to the analysis of the two-stage game, I will first examine whether the
first-best abatement levels can be implemented under asymmetric information about
abatement costs and voluntary participation in an agreement. This will help define
when a pre-negotiation stage with a certification device can be used as a channel
to restore the feasibility of an efficient agreement. Combining Bayesian incentive
compatibility (2), budget balance (4) and interim individual rationality (6) yields
the following proposition:11
Proposition 1 The first-best agreement yFB is implementable for all (θ1, θ2) ∈ Rθ×




11This is the equivalent of Proposition 1 in Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2016), but for the case
of a pure global pollutant and two countries.
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Proof See Online Appendix A2. 
The first-best agreement is feasible only if the level of uncertainty (γ) is rela-
tively low. To understand this result, we need to figure out the impact of the length
of the support Rθ on individual rationality and incentive compatibility. By Lemma
1 and equation (3), we know that when γ is high, incentives problems are more
severe and truth-telling from low-cost countries may require very large information
rent. As the budget balance constraint must always be satisfied, the compensations
granted to these low-cost countries are limited by the necessity to ensure participa-
tion of all countries, including the ones with very high abatement costs. Therefore,
when the support of the distribution of types is very large, one cannot find incentive
compatible transfers that implement the first-best abatement levels and that give
all types (including those with very high abatement costs) strictly more than their
expected non-cooperative payoffs.
Condition (7) also implies that it is easier to implement the first-best agreement
when θM is high. For a given γ, a larger θM means that, on average, abatement
costs are lower and the welfare gains from reaching the first-best agreement are
higher. These larger gains can be redistributed among countries to ensure incentive
compatibility and individual rationality.
3 The two-stage game
As shown in Proposition 1, there is a tension between incentive compatibility, budget
balance and individual rationality that may prevent countries from reaching the first-
best agreement. In this section, I examine whether a certification stage preceding
negotiations about abatement levels and transfers constitutes a channel to alleviate
this tension and restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement. Specifically, I
analyze a game consisting of two stages:
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• Stage 1 or certification stage. Countries don’t know the exact cost of abate-
ment. They only have common prior beliefs over the support interval Rθ. To
investigate what could be the cost of reducing pollution, countries have two
options: doing the research privately and independently or sharing gathered
information through an international agency, which must be able to monitor
and certify the information transmitted (assisted by a scientific body for ex-
ample). Let si denote the action (or strategy) of country i in stage 1. Ex-ante
(i.e. before learning their own abatement costs), countries decide simultane-
ously whether to reveal their type through the certification device offered by
the international agency (si = C) or to stay privately informed (si = NC).
12
• Stage 2 or abatement stage. Countries at least privately know their types θi












∣∣∣∣Rθ = [θM − γ, θM + γ] and θM3 < γ < θM
}
i.e. support intervals Rθ such that the first-best agreement is not feasible without
certification (condition (7) in Propostion 1 is not satisfied).
Stage 2: abatement game
The information structure (i.e. whether countries’ types are privately or publicly
known) will determine the kind of environmental agreement that can be implemented
12The assumption that the decision is taken ex-ante is made to abstract from signaling issues
(as in Kakeu & Johnson (2018)). This specification is also consistent with the large literature on
information exchange in oligopoly with private information about costs. In a typical scenario, the
firms participate in information exchange before playing a one-shot Cournot game. Information is
assumed to be verifiable, i.e. a firm can conceal its private information but cannot misrepresent
it. Examples include Li (1985), Gal-Or (1986), and, more recently, Amir et al. (2010). I discuss
this assumption in the next section.
16
in stage 2. In particular, three information structures are possible given the actions
taken in stage 1.
1. Complete information when actions taken in stage 1 are (s1, s2) = (C,C)
2. Two-sided asymmetric information when actions taken in stage 1 are (s1, s2) =
(NC,NC)
3. One-sided asymmetric information when actions taken in stage 1 are either
(s1, s2) = (C,NC) or (s1, s2) = (NC,C)
Below, we derive the optimal environmental agreements in these three possible sit-
uations.
Complete information. When countries’ types θi are public knowledge, abate-
ment and transfer levels do not have to be incentive compatible. The optimal mech-
anism will be the mechanism that maximizes global welfare, subject to the budget
balance and individual rationality constraints (4) and (6). Using the participation
constraint (6) evaluated at the first-best abatement levels, aFBi , the transfers nec-
essary to make each country willing to participate in the first-best agreement are
given by: tFBi (θi, θj) ≥ 18θi −
1
4
θj for i 6= j. Summing up these two participation
constraints, and using the budget balance constraint, tFB1 (θ1, θ2) + t
FB





which holds for all Rθ ×Rθ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 2 Under complete information, for all Rθ×Rθ ∈ Θ, the optimal mechanism
is the first-best agreement yFB.
Therefore, when the actions taken in stage 1 are (s1, s2) = (C,C), such that
there is complete information in stage 2, the first-best mechanism is implemented
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i (θi, θj) (8)
where tFBi (θi, θj) satisfies the participation and budget balance constraints for i 6= j.
Two-sided asymmetric information. When countries’ types are private infor-
mation with support intervals Rθ × Rθ ∈ Θ, the optimal mechanism is the mecha-
nism that maximizes the expected global welfare subject to (2), (4), and (6). Due
to the tension between ensuring incentive compatibility for the low-cost countries
and participation from the high-cost countries, the optimal mechanism cannot be
the first-best agreement. To solve this tension, the optimal second-best mechanism
reduces abatements below the first-best levels for all types (except for the lowest-
cost country, θM + γ). As shown in the Online Appendix A3, it is very difficult to
find closed-form expressions for the second-best transfers and abatement levels. For
this reason, I follow Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2016) who show that due to the
convexity of the optimal second-best mechanism, this schedule can be approximated






2 ), with two options, denoted by SB1 and SB2.
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In option 1 (SB1), a country does not expand abatement effort beyond the





θi but it contributes a fixed amount t
to a fund. In option 2 (SB2), a country chooses its first-best level of abatement
aSB2i = a
FB
i = θi and receives a transfer made of two parts: a fixed contribution to a
fund t̄ (with t̄ > t) and a subsidy of 1
2
per unit of abatement. Similarly to the first-
best transfer, this subsidy can be seen as a per-unit Pigouvian subsidy because 1
2
is
just the difference between the social and private marginal benefits of abatement.
Countries will self-select between these two options according to their costs of
abatement. In the Online Appendix A3, I show that there exists a unique cutoff
type θ∗, which is just indifferent between the two options, i.e. for which the expected
13Using numerical simulations, Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2016) also show that when the
distribution of types is a uniform, the welfare loss from using a two-item menu instead of the
optimal mechanism is very small.
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j ]− t̄︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. Utility under SB2





j ] is the expected abatement level of the other country under
the two-item menu. All types below (resp. above) θ∗, will choose the first (resp.
second) option. To ensure participation of the high-cost countries (θi < θ
∗), their
contribution t must be chosen such that they do not get an expected payoff lower
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Intuitively, the contribution of high-cost countries must be equivalent to the exter-
nality gain created by the extra abatement effort under the second-best mechanism
compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. The system of equations formed by
the budget balance constraint (4), the participation constraint (10) and the indif-
ference condition (9) has a unique solution:
Lemma 3 Under two-sided asymmetric information, for all Rθ×Rθ ∈ Θ, the opti-
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θi if θi ∈ [θM − γ, θ∗)
θi if θi ∈ [θ∗, θM + γ]
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tSBi =




if θi ∈ [θM − γ, θ∗)
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if θi ∈ [θ∗, θM + γ]
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Proof See Online Appendix A3. 
Therefore, when the actions taken in stage 1 are (s1, s2) = (NC,NC), such that each
country is privately informed about its own type in stage 2, country i’s expected
payoff from the second-best mechanism is:
 U
N




(θi − θ∗) if θi ∈ [θ∗, θM + γ]
(11)
A country with a type θi < θ
∗ chooses the first option of the two-item menu
and is left with its expected non-cooperative payoff. As its abatement costs are too
high, this country would rather contribute to a fund that can be used to subsidize
lower-cost countries (i.e. θi ≥ θ∗). In return, this country does not have to abate
beyond its non-cooperative level. Under the second option, the low-cost countries
receive an information rent, which is increasing in their own type, and gives them
an incentive to abate at their first-best level. This allows them to reach an expected
utility higher than the non-cooperative level.
One-sided asymmetric information. Assume that the actions taken in stage 1
are (s1, s2) = (C,NC) (the case where (s1, s2) = (NC,C) is symmetric). Country 1’s
type is public knowledge and country 2’s type is privately known. I first derive the
following Lemma, which states that, under one-sided asymmetric information, the
first-best agreement can be implemented if country 1’s abatement cost is sufficiently
low.
Lemma 4 When country 1’s type is public knowledge and country 2’s type is pri-
vately known, the first-best agreement is implementable for all θ2 ∈ Rθ if and only
if θ1 ≥ θ̃ = max{3γ − θM ; θM − γ}.
Proof See Online Appendix A4. 
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The intuition behind this result is similar to Proposition 1. As θ1 increases, abate-
ment costs of country 1 decrease and the welfare gain from reaching the first-best
agreement increases. Moreover, as country 1’s type is public knowledge, the trans-
fer to country 1 does not have to be incentive compatible. It is therefore easier to
find transfers satisfying the participation constraints for both countries and that are
incentive compatible for country 2 only.
The critical type θ̃, from which the first-best agreement can be implemented,
is increasing in the length of the support interval: the tension between incentive
compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality is stronger for higher levels
of uncertainty. A higher value of θ1 is then necessary to solve the tension. If the
level of uncertainty is not too high (i.e. θM
3
< γ ≤ θM
2
), then any country 1’s type
will allow to implement the first-best abatement levels under one-sided asymmetric
information (θ̃ = θM − γ). When θM2 < γ < θM , the critical type θ̃ = 3γ− θM is not
the lower bound of the support interval.
If country 1’s abatement cost is not sufficiently low (θ1 < θ̃), countries have
to negotiate a second-best agreement that maximizes the expected global welfare
subject to the incentive, participation and budget balance constraints. The objective
is to find a feasible agreement in which abatement levels are as close as possible to the
first-best levels. As its abatement cost is publicly known, country 1 is requested to
exert its first-best abatement effort and receives a transfer to ensure its participation,
while country 2 is offered a two-item menu (SB1, SB2) similar to the one derived
under two-sided asymmetric information.14
Lemma 5 Under one-sided asymmetric information (with type θ1 publicly known),
for all Rθ ×Rθ ∈ Θ, the optimal mechanism y∗(θ1, θ2) is:
• the first-best agreement if θ1 ≥ θ̃: y∗ = yFB = (aFB1 , aFB2 , tFB1 , tFB2 )
14Note that here the optimal mechanism is the mechanism that maximizes the total expected
welfare. This is different from Helm & Wirl (2016a), who look at a situation with one-sided
private information in which the non-informed country has all the bargaining power and proposes
a contract to the informed country.
21

















• the second-best agreement if θ1 < θ̃: y∗ = ySB = (aSB1 , aSB2 , tSB1 , tSB2 )
where country 1 exerts an abatement effort equal to its first-best level aSB1 = θ1








while country 2 is offered a two-item menu (SB1,SB2), with cutoff type θ∗ ∈








+ γ(θM − γ) (12)
Proof See Online Appendix A4. 
The main difference compared to the optimal mechanism under two-sided asymmet-
ric information is that the cutoff θ∗ is lower. As country 1’s type is public knowledge,
incentives problems are less severe and it is possible to design transfers such that
the second option of the menu, in which country 2 abates at the first-best level, is
chosen by a larger proportion of country 2’s types.





8(θ1 − θM + γ) if θ1 ∈ [θM − γ, θ̃)
UN1 (θ1) +
1
8(θ1 − 3γ + θM ) if θ1 ∈ [θ̃, θM + γ]
(13)
15As shown by expression (3), an incentive compatible first-best transfer will depend on the
transfer received by the lowest type, tFB2 (θ1, θM − γ). The objective of the next section is to
determine whether countries have an incentive to undergo certification. The answer to that question
will obviously depend on the transfer received under the first-best agreement. Here, we will consider
the most favorable case for country 1 (i.e. the country choosing certification): country 2 (with
private information) receives the minimum transfer required to ensure truthful participation, i.e.
a transfer similar to expression (3) in which the participation constraint binds for the lowest type.
As a result, the maximum transfer country 1 can expect under one-sided asymmetric information
is tFB1 , which satisfies its participation constraint as long as θ1 ≥ θ̃.
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while country 2’s payoff is

UN2 (θ1, θ2) if θ1 ∈ [θM − γ, θ̃), θ2 ∈ [θM − γ, θ∗)
UN2 (θ1, θ2) +
3
8(θ2 − θ
∗) if θ1 ∈ [θM − γ, θ̃), θ2 ∈ [θ∗, θM + γ]
UN2 (θ1, θ2) +
3
8(θ2 − θM + γ) if θ1 ∈ [θ̃, θM + γ]
(14)
where θ̃ = max{3γ−θM ; θM−γ}, θ∗ is given by (12) and UN2 (θ1, θ2) ≡ V2(yN(θ1, θ2)|θ1, θ2)
accounts for the fact that country 2 knows country 1’s type. Even if country 1 is re-
warded less per unit of effort, it gains from joining the agreement for all θ1 > θM −γ
(see equation (13)). By contrast, the privately informed country will obtain a payoff
larger than its non-cooperative level only if θ1 ≥ θ̃ or if it chooses option 2 of the
second-best mechanism (when θ1 < θ̃).
Stage 1: certification
At this stage, countries simultaneously choose whether they agree to gather infor-
mation through a joint research project and allow the international agency to certify
their type: si ∈ {C,NC}. The effect of certification is twofold. On the one hand, by
revealing a country’s type, certification reduces the information asymmetry, which
was responsible for the tension between incentive compatibility, budget balance and
individual rationality constraints in stage 2. As shown in Lemmas 2 and 5, certi-
fication by country i implies that this country always exerts the first-best level of
effort and country j chooses the first-best abatement level “more often”. Certifi-
cation generates efficiency gains defined as the difference in terms of global welfare
between the first-best agreement and the optimal mechanism implemented in stage
2.
On the other hand, certification implies the loss of the information rent for the
country revealing its type. Countries might have an incentive to free-ride on each
others’ certification in order to keep their potentially large information rent in the
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second stage of the game. The level of uncertainty about abatement costs, γ, will
play a key role in the decision of country i to share private information because it
will affect the magnitude of the two effects mentioned above (through its impact on
the cutoff types θ̃ and θ∗, defined in Lemmas 3, 4 and 5).
First, the efficiency gains generated by either one-sided or two-sided certifica-
tion are increasing in γ. Indeed, when γ is relatively small (close to θM
3
), both cutoff
types θ̃ and θ∗ are either equal or close to the lower bound of the support interval,
θM − γ, which implies that most types will be required to abate at their first-best
level under the optimal mechanism. The expected global welfare will be very similar
under the three possible information structures. By contrast, as γ increases, both θ̃
and θ∗ increase, reducing the probability that a country staying privately informed
chooses the first-best level of abatement under the optimal mechanism. Certification
by this country will therefore generate higher efficiency gains.
Second, the probability to be considered as a low-cost country entitled to an
information rent, and to obtain an expected payoff higher than under the outside
option, [1 − F (θ∗)], is decreasing in the level of uncertainty. This effect reduces
the incentives to free-ride on each others’ certification. Payoffs associated with each
second-stage outcome are given by equations (8), (11), (13) and (14). To find the
equilibrium in stage 1, I first analyze countries’ best responses.
Best response of country i when sj = NC
In Lemma 6, I show that for relatively low levels of uncertainty, the second effect (loss
of information rent) dominates the first one (efficiency gains). The efficiency gains
generated by unilateral certification are not large enough. Even when the transfer
granted to country j is the minimum transfer (i.e. that just satisfies individual
rationality for the lowest type), the first-best transfer received by country i (when
it chooses si = C) does not compensate for the loss of the information rent. Hence,
si = C cannot be a best response to sj = NC. As efficiency gains are increasing in
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γ, while the probability to obtain an information rent in stage 2 is decreasing in γ,
there exists a level of uncertainty from which we can find transfers that compensate
for the loss of a “less likely” information rent and si = C is a best response to
sj = NC.
Lemma 6 The best response of country i when sj = NC is the following:
s∗i =
 NC if γ < γ̄
NC = 0.9115θM
C if γ ≥ γ̄NC = 0.9115θM
Proof See Online Appendix A5. 
Best response of country i when sj = C
As mentioned earlier, under unilateral certification by country j, this country is
already exerting the first-best level of effort, while country i’s expected abatement
level is also higher than under two-sided asymmetric information. As a result,
efficiency gains generated by country i’s certification will be smaller than in the
situation where country j is privately informed (Lemma 6). When sj = C, the
threshold from which the efficiency gains will be large enough to find first-best
budget-balanced transfers that compensate country i for the loss of the information
rent it could obtain by staying privately informed, will therefore be higher than
when sj = NC.
Lemma 7 The best response of country i when sj = C is the following:
s∗i =
 NC if γ < γ̄
C = 0.9296θM
C if γ ≥ γ̄C = 0.9296θM
Proof See Online Appendix A6. 
The equilibrium in stage 1
It is now possible to characterize the equilibrium of the game in stage 1. Given
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the best responses detailed above (Lemma 6 and Lemma 7), we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium in stage 1 is defined as follows:
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Proof See Online Appendix A7. 
Can certification restore the feasibility of the first-best agree-
ment?
The result of the two-stage game is summarized in Figure 1. The opportunity
for countries to set up an international agency entitled to certify their abatement
costs can fully restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement only if the level of
uncertainty is very high, i.e. γ ≥ γ̄C . For these levels of uncertainty, the second-
best agreement is relatively close to the non-cooperative equilibrium in terms of
welfare because the probability that a country chooses its non-cooperative level of
abatement, F (θ∗), is high. The efficiency gains of reaching the first-best agreement
will then be sufficiently large to design first-best budget-balanced transfers tFBi (θi, θj)
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p = Prob(si = C)
i = 1, 2
(C,C)
∗ qFB is the probability that the first-best is implemented when γ ∈ (γ̄NC , γ̄C).
(a) For the pure-startegy equilibria, the FB agreement is implemented if for s∗i = C, θi > θ̃.
This implies that qFB = 1− F (θ̃) = θM−γγ .
(b)For the mixed-startegy equilibrium, the FB agreement is implemented with probability
qFB = p2 + 2p(1− p) θM−γγ , where p is the probability that country i plays si = C.
Figure 1: Summary of the results
certification. No country has an incentive to free-ride on the other’s action because
the risk to implement a second-best agreement agreement, which is close to the
non-cooperative equilibrium, is substantial and so a country’s expected benefits of
keeping its information rent are very low.
4 Discussion
For tractability, the model presented in sections 1-3 relies on a number of simplifying
assumptions. In this section, I discuss the impact of relaxing some of them.
4.1 Asymmetric information about benefits from abatement
So far we have considered a model in which private information is about costs, while
benefits from abatement are known. In section B of the Online Appendix, I shift
private information from costs to benefits and show that the main results of the
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model remain qualitatively unchanged.
It is first possible to derive the equivalent of Proposition 1. In other words,
we can show that a first-best agreement will be implementable only for levels of
uncertainty about marginal benefits that are relatively low. This is again due to the
tension between ensuring incentive compatibility for countries with high marginal
benefits (which have an incentive to misreport their type to reduce the effort required
under the agreement) and individual rationality for low-type countries.16
As for the case of private information about costs, it is very difficult to find
a closed-form solution for the second-best transfers and abatement levels.17 At the
same time, resorting to an approximation by a two-item menu in which countries
choosing their non-cooperative abatement level, contribute a fixed (type-independent)
amount t to a fund, as described in section 3, will not be appropriate. With pri-
vate information about benefits, the optimal second-best mechanism is similar to
the mechanism presented in Online Appendix A3: the participation constraint for
countries with low marginal benefits from abatement binds and they exert their non-
cooperative level of effort, while countries with higher marginal benefits strictly gain
from joining the agreement and exert a higher level of effort. However, the expected
transfer received by a country for which the participation constraint binds is not
constant anymore. This is due to the fact that the externality gain generated by a
second-best agreement (and that is used to compute the transfer under the second-
best mechanism) depends on a country’s marginal benefit, which is constant and
equal to 1/2 when uncertainty is about costs, but is type-dependent and privately
known when uncertainty is about marginal benefits.18
16Helm & Wirl (2016b) also discuss how a shift of private information from costs to benefits
affects the conditions to implement the first-best agreements, but they focus on a case with a
continuum of infinitesimally small countries.
17Helm & Wirl (2014) and Helm & Wirl (2016b) derive the optimal second-best mechanism when
private information is about marginal benefits. However, they rely on a principal-agent framework
with one-sided asymmetric information only.
18Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2016) show that in a case where countries also differ in terms of
their marginal benefit of abatement and it is private information, the properties of their two-item
menu are similar to those obtained when costs are the sole source of heterogeneity. However, they
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Nevertheless, we can pursue a more modest objective and derive the equi-
librium of a two-stage game in which if countries cannot implement the first-best
agreement in stage 2, they resort to the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome. The
optimal abatement efforts and transfers will obviously be affected, but the main re-
sult that both countries will share their information only if the level of uncertainty
is very high, remains.
4.2 Verifiable Information
So far, we have assumed that in the certification stage, countries have to decide
whether to conduct research on their abatement cost privately or through a joint
research project and the information shared is costlessly and totally verifiable by an
international agency. In sections C and D of the Online Appendix, I explore two
extensions to show how these assumptions affect the main results of the model.
I first show in section C that introducing research costs (or costs of setting
up an international agency in stage 1) only affects the threshold values obtained in
section 3, γ̄NC and γ̄C . However, as long as these research costs are not too high,
the main result that there exist some support intervals, characterized by high levels
of uncertainty, for which certification by both countries is the unique equilibrium in
stage 1, still remains.
Second, instead of assuming that certification reveals each player’s type and
thus eliminates all private information, I suppose that the international agency can
only certify whether the country’s cost parameter is above or below the mean θM .
Partial verifiability reduces the benefits, and so the attractiveness, of certification
because it does not completely eliminate asymmetric information and does not re-
store the feasibility of the first-best for all possible support intervals and all types
of countries. Partial verifiability also reduces the cost of certification as a country
derive this result assuming that the externality is common knowledge and constant, and only the
local benefits are private information. This implies that the contribution under the first option of
the menu is still constant.
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using certification does not lose its entire information rent. This may increase a
country’s willingness to use this mechanism.
In section D of the Online Appendix, I show that the second effect dominates
and the threshold values for the equilibrium in stage 1, γ̄NC and γ̄C , are lower than
in the model with full revelation of countries’ types. Countries will use certification
more often; however, certification by both countries does not imply that the first-
best agreement will be implemented in stage 2 as it does not completely eliminate
asymmetric information. In fact, when certification by both countries restore the
feasibility of the first-best agreement for all possible types in [θM − γ, θM + γ] (i.e.
when γ ≤ 1
2
θM), the unique equilibrium is (NC,NC). By contrast, for γ ∈ (γ̄C , θM),
where the unique equilibrium in stage 1 is (C,C), certification restores the feasibility
of the first-best agreement only when both countries report low abatement costs in
stage 1, i.e. θi ∈ [θM , θM + γ]. In other cases, certification still generates efficiency
gains as the reduction in information asymmetry allows countries to negotiate a
second-best agreement in which a larger proportion of types chooses their first-best
abatement levels.
4.3 Timing in stage 1
The timing of stage 1 (i.e. the fact that countries decide whether to share information
ex ante and the transmitted information is certifiable or provable by the international
institution) is used to abstract from signaling incentives. A more realistic setting
would be that in the certification stage, a country is better informed about its own
abatement costs than about the abatement costs of the other country. This would
lead to an analysis of strategic information transmission, in which not accepting
certification sends a signal to the other country.
The game discussed in this paper is however more complex than the games
analyzed in the literature about strategic information transmission (e.g. Okuno-
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Fujiwara et al. 1990; Cramton & Palfrey 1995, Hagenbach et al. 2014). These
papers typically analyze pre-play communication in Bayesian games with a unique
equilibrium. Even though the equilibrium abatement levels in stage 2 are unique, the
first-best transfers are not necessarily unique. Moreover, the nature of the agreement
negotiated in stage 2 (first-best or second-best) depends on the level of uncertainty,
which will in turn depend on the updated beliefs about the other country’s abate-
ment costs after the communication stage. The resolution of the game then requires
making strong assumptions regarding the beliefs about the outcome of future nego-
tiations (nature of agreement and transfers levels) conditional on observable moves.
To overcome these issues and explore how changing the timing of informa-
tion sharing affects the results of the paper, I present, in section E of the Online
Appendix, a simplified version of the model, in which I use the concept of credible
veto set (Cramton & Palfrey 1995) to determine the off-equilibrium path beliefs. In
this new version of the model, countries privately know their type in stage 1 and
have to decide to share this information through the certification device proposed by
the international agency. When deciding to refuse the certification device in stage
1, a country will consider how the other country’s beliefs (and so the agreement
negotiated in stage 2) may change as a result of this decision.
I focus on the existence of a ratifiable certification device, i.e. whether for
both countries at the same time and all types θi ∈ [θM − γ, θM + γ], there does
not exist a subset of types that strictly benefit from refusing certification under
updated beliefs. The full analysis is detailed in section E of the Online Appendix.
The main result is that a certification device will be ratifiable only when the level
of uncertainty is sufficiently high (i.e. γ > 2
5
θM). Even though this looks similar
to the results in section 3, the interpretation is very different because the change
in timing affects the costs of refusing certification. In the main model, the cost of
staying privately informed was a loss of efficiency (e.g. implementation of a second-
best agreement instead of the first-best agreement). In this modified model, both
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strategies (NC and C) imply the (partial) loss of a country’s information rent due
to updated beliefs.
As shown previously, the cost of certification might be substantial for low-cost
countries (i.e. countries with a high θi) because they lose a potentially high informa-
tion rent when they reveal their type. This is not the case for high-cost countries,
because their payoffs under a second-best agreement will always be either equal
or very close to the non-cooperative outcome. By refusing certification, country i
sends a credible signal that it has a relatively low-cost of abatement θi ∈ [θi, θM +γ],
with θi > θM − γ. These updated beliefs allow the mechanism designer to update
the agreement in stage 2 and reduce the information rent for country i. But these
updated beliefs also imply a lower level of asymmetric information.
For low levels of γ, even a small reduction in asymmetric information induced
by updated beliefs would be enough to implement an agreement where both countries
choose their first-best abatement levels. In that case, both ratifying and refusing
certification lead to the same efficiency gains. It is then possible to find a subset of
low-cost countries that are better off staying privately informed with updated beliefs
and a (reduced) information rent than revealing their type through certification and
losing their entire information rent. For higher levels of uncertainty, the incentives
problems are more severe. As a result, it is impossible to find updated beliefs
[θi, θM + γ] that generate a sizable increase in global welfare, while still allowing
country i to benefit from a large information rent. In this situation, a country will
ratify the certification device for all types.
5 Conclusion
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to study the effect of asymmetric
information about abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental
agreement when participation is voluntary. Due to the tension between incentive
32
compatibility and participation, a first-best agreement cannot always be reached.
For this reason, I investigate the role of a pre-negotiation phase as an information-
sharing and certification device to alleviate the inefficiencies generated by informa-
tion asymmetry and voluntary participation. The introduction of this certification
stage is motivated by the fact that many existing international environmental agree-
ments with explicit abatement targets have been preceded by an umbrella convention
that set up a structure to gather countries’ information related to the environmental
issue.
The ability of a certification stage to restore the feasibility of the first-best
agreement will depend on the relative magnitude of two effects. First, by eliminat-
ing totally or partially information asymmetry between countries at the negotiation
stage, certification reduces the tension between the incentive compatibility and par-
ticipation constraints. Second, the country using certification loses the possibility
to misreport its abatement cost during the negotiation stage. This loss is larger
for countries with lower abatement costs, which under asymmetric information, will
require a higher payoff to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. When the
level of uncertainty about abatement costs is high enough, the welfare gains of reduc-
ing information asymmetries and reaching the first-best agreement are substantial,
while the probability to be considered as a low-cost country and benefit from a large
information rent is low. As a result, the first effect dominates and both countries
opt for certification in the first stage. The feasibility of the first-best agreement is
restored for those high levels of uncertainty.
The results of the model point towards the importance of coordinated research
efforts to achieve efficient environmental agreements and prevent countries from
claiming substantial information rents. However, information-sharing is not suffi-
cient, this information must also be certified such that it can be used as a basis to
negotiate subsequent environmental targets. For example, in the case of acid rains,
the creation of mutually agreed-upon scientific knowledge has been a the center of
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international cooperation since the very beginning (e.g. in the LRTAP Convention).
This principle also appears in the second Sulfur Protocol in 1994. The national
emission reductions under this protocol have been calculated using integrated as-
sessment models (especially RAINS). These models have been developed through
international research projects involving a large number of scientists from different
countries. The results of these models were therefore less easy to dispute, reducing
the ability of countries to misreport their willingness-to-pay for an agreement.
A lot of simplifying assumptions have been used to highlight the effects of
certification. A first important extension could be to consider that abatement efforts
are not totally observable, so that there is a problem of moral hazard during the
implementation of the first-best agreement. Second, interim individual rationality
is used as a participation constraint. In the case of international environmental
treaties, countries can withdraw from the agreement at no cost after observing the
outcome of the negotiations. This will clearly affect the ability of countries to design
a mechanism implementing the first-best abatement levels and it would be worth to
explore the impact of imposing ex-post, rather than interim, individual rationality
constraints.
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